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The West Coast Salmon Dispute: A
Canadian View
of the Breakdown of the 1985 Treaty
and the Transit License Measure
TED

I.

L.

MCDORMAN"

INTRODUCTION

In June 1994, Canada enacted a regulation requiring foreign
fishing vessels that cross selected west coast Canadian waters to
purchase a license for such passage! Canada directed the action
at U.S. salmon fishing vessels, which previously were exempted
from the Canadian law requiring permission to use the waters of
Canada's west coast known as the "Inside Passage."2 The

* B.A. (Toronto); LL.B., LL.M. (Dalhousie); Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,
and Associate, Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria, Victoria, British
Columbia, Canada and Associate, Oceans Institute of Canada, Halifax. The author wishes
to acknowledge the assistance of Catherine J. Parker, who, however, wishes to disassociate
herself from any and all comments and conclusions in this Article.
1. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Licence Fee
Announced For U.S. Vessels (June 9, 1994). Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations,
C.R.C. ch. 413, amended by SOR/94-444, 1994 C. Gaz. 2575-78 (Can.). See Miro Cernetig,
Canada Moves to Protect B. C. Salmon, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 10, 1994, at Al,
A4; Mark Hume, U.S. Boats Face Through-B.C. Fee, VANCOUVER SUN, June 10, 1994, at
Al, A2; Ron Sudlow, Canada Fires $1,500 Shot at U.S. Boats in Fish War, VICrORIA
TIMES-COLONIST, June 10, 1994, at A1, A2.

2. "A United States fishing vessel may, without the authority of a license, pass
through the Canadian fisheries waters known as the 'Inside Passage' on the west coast of
Canada if it complies with the conditions described in section 15(2)." Coastal Fisheries
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breakdown of Canadian-U.S. negotiations to revitalize the 1985

Pacific Salmon Treaty3 caused the Canadian action. Canada
broke off the negotiations and required the transit license to
pressure the United States to unify and modify its position on the
alleged4 excessive "interception" of salmon originating in Canadian
rivers.
In early July, the transit license requirement was removed
after U.S. Vice President Al Gore directly intervened to assure
Canada that progress was possible in renewed negotiations.5 Thus
far, negotiations have failed to produce salmon management
arrangements satisfactory to Canada.
On the west coast of North America, where salmon is truly
fisheries' royalty, salmon has been foremost among Canada's

international ocean concerns for many years. Salmon is an
anadromous species that begins life in fresh water rivers, migrates
to the ocean where it intermingles, and then returns to spawn in
the fresh water river of its origin. This life cycle poses particular
problems for resource management and international relations. As
early as 1930, Canada and the United States signed a treaty to

establish the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission to

regulate Frasier River sockeye salmon fishing.6 Moreover,
following World War II, Canada entered into a tripartite agreement with the United States and Japan. This agreement's primary
purpose was to curb Japanese fishing of North American salmon.7

Protection Regulations, C.R.C. ch. 413, § 17 (1978), amended by SOR/85-527, 1994 C. Gaz.
2719, 2725 § 13 (Can.). The primary condition in section 15(2) is to have a fishing vessel
stow its gear below deck or otherwise restrict its availability for fishing. Id.
3. Pacific Salmon Treaty, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., 99 Stat. 7 [hereinafter Pacific
Salmon Treaty].
4. Article 1(4) of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty defines interception as "the
harvesting of salmon originating in the waters of one Party by a fishery of the other
Party." Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, art. 1(4). See Thomas C. Jensen, The United
States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historicaland Legal Overview, 16
ENvmL. L. 363, 369 (1986).
5. Gore's Assurance on Salmon Lifts Block on Stalled Talks, VICTORIA TIMESCOLONIST, July 3, 1994, at A2; Karen Gram, Canada Catches Concessions in Salmon Scrap,
VANCOUVER SUN, July 4, 1994, at B1; Thomas W. Haines, Lifting of Boat Fee Paves Way
for Fish Talks to Resume, SEATrLE TIMES, July 3, 1994, at Al.
6. Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon
Fishery in the Fraser River System, May 26, 1930, U.S.-Can., 8 U.S.T. 1058 [hereinafter
Fraser River Treaty]. The treaty did not have legal effect until 1937 due to U.S. delay in
ratification. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 374 n.24.
7. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, 205 U.N.T.S. 80. See generally E. MILES ET AL., THE
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During the 1970s, salmon was again at the forefront of Canadian
concerns, specifically during the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter UNCLOS III], because this
meeting was designed to establish an international convention for
ocean uses.8 Although the 200-n. mile fishing zone received
primary attention at UNCLOS III and clearly has implications for
salmon management, the final product of UNCLOS III was the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.9 This
treaty contains a sdpecific provision, Article 66, relating to
anadromous species.
Introducing the 200-n. mile fishing zone and including a
specific regime for anadromous species were significant considerations in the re-examination of the 1930 Fraser River Treaty.11
After protracted negotiations, the United States and Canada
entered into the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty. 12 Breakdown of this
treaty led Canada to impose the transit license.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a context for the
Canada-U.S. salmon dispute on the west coast by outlining the
Law of the Sea [hereinafter LOS] Convention's salmon provisions
and the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty's content and operation, and
briefly analyzing the Canadian transit license's international
legality. Negotiations for a bilateral accord for west coast salmon
management are continuing, but the prospects. for a long-term
agreement satisfactory to Canada are not good.

MANAGEMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES: THE NORTH PACIFIC 55-63, 170-73 (1982). See
also J.A. Yogis, Canadian Fisheries and InternationalLaw, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES

ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 398,402-03 (R. St.J. Macdonald et al. eds.,
1974).

The 1951 Treaty was replaced in February 1992 by the Convention for the
Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean. Canada, the United
States, Japan, and Russia are parties. The 1992 Convention has established the North
Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC) to promote the conservation of salmon
in the North Pacific.
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signatureDec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261-1354 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Convention].
9. Id
10. Id. art. 66.

11. See Fraser River Treaty, supra note 6.
12. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3.
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II. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
A. The Anadromous Species Regime
At UNCLOS III, Canada's original position respecting
offshore fishery resources was described as the "species approach."13 Under this approach, the international community was
to authorize Canada to manage particular species located in waters
adjacent to Canada because, as the state with the most direct
interest in the resource, Canada would be in the best position to
ensure appropriate conservation.14 This species-centered approach, based on resource management principles, was swept aside
by the international community's interest in the creation of a 200n. mile exclusive economic zone [hereinafter EEZ]. Support for
the EEZ became a tidal wave that struck UNCLOS III in 1973 and
1974.15 Canada supported this spatial approach but continued to
argue that anadromous
species, specifically salmon, should be
16
treated separately.
Canada's special concern for salmon arose not only from the
economic and cultural importance of salmon on the west coast, but
also from the east coast salmon stocks' dramatic decline.17 At
UNCLOS III, Canada went to extraordinary lengths to support its
view that an anadromous species' state of origin had special
obligations and rights throughout the species' life cycle irrespective
of the waters where it could be found.18 One commentator

13. For a summary of the Canadian position, see Barbara Johnson, CanadianForeign
Policy and Fisheries, in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 73-74

(Barbara Johnson & Mark W. Zacher eds., 1977).
14. This Canadian viewpoint is well articulated by L.H.J. Legault, Maritime Claims,
in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 392-93 (R.
St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1974); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 72-73.
15. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 77, 83.
16. See id.
17. For a discussion on the east coast salmon stocks' depletion in the 1970s, see Owen
Myers, The Management of TransboundaryStocks: Atlantic Salmon and Northern Shrimp,
in CANADIAN OCEAN LAW AND POLICY 96-99 (David VanderZwaag ed., 1992).
Concerning east coast salmon in general, see id.at 92-108; DEREK MILLS & DAVID
PIGGINS, ATLANTIC SALMON: PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 587 (1988); Jill L. Bubier,
InternationalManagement ofAtlantic Salmon: Equitable Sharingand Building Consensus,
19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 35-57 (1988).
18. Canada. Working Paper on the Special Case of Salmon-the most important
anadromousspecies, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2fL. 81 (1974), 3 THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS

240 (1975).
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described Canada's passion for salmon at UNCLOS III in the
following terms: "[t]he promotion of the cause of salmon, carried
out by distributing a 'salmon portfolio' to all delegations, took on
the appearance of a crusade ....""
Canada and the United States, together with several other
states with special interests in salmon, caused Article 66 of the
LOS Convention, the special regime on salmon, to be drafted.2"
Of the special classes of species acknowledged in the LOS
Convention, the anadromous species regime is the most detailed.
Two factors have been suggested for the extent of this detail. 1
First, only a handful of states had a direct interest in salmon.2
Second, Japan might have been expected to object to a salmon
regime that gave special authority to the salmon's state of
origin. 2 Japan, however, had already accepted the principle of
special rights via the 1951 North Pacific Fisheries Treaty with
Canada and the United States.24
Article 66(1) of the LOS Convention establishes the framework for managing salmon by directing that "[s]tates in whose
rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest
Thus, the state of origin
and responsibility for such stocks."'
principle is unquestionably enshrined in the LOS Convention, as
is that state's responsibility to take appropriate measures ensuring
resource conservation.26 The other paragraphs of Article 66
"establish how states of origin are to protect their interests and
discharge their responsibilities."27

19. Johnson, supra note 13, at 83.
20. Concerning the drafting and negotiating of Article 66 of the LOS Convention, see
II UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 66579 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993); William T. Burke, Anadromous
Species and the New InternationalLaw of the Sea, 22 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 95, 100-02
(1991).
21. DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES at lxxii (1987);
see also Yogis, supra note 7, at 398, 402-03.
22. JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at lxxii; see Yogis, supra note 7, at 398, 402-03.
23. See Yogis, supra note 7, at 398, 402-03.
24. See id. Concerning recent issues of high seas salmon capture on the North
American west coast, see generally Burke, supra note 20, at 107-08; Ted L. McDorman,
Canada and the North Pacific Ocean: Recent Issues, 22 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 365, 37072 (1991).
25. For a detailed discussion on the interpretation of LOS Convention, art. 66(1), see
Burke, supra note 20, at 102.
26. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 66(2).
27. Burke, supra note 20, at 102.
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The major issue addressed in the LOS Convention
anadromous stocks regime concerns salmon interception activities
beyond the 200-n. mile zone. Paragraph 3(a) of Article 66
prohibits salmon fishing on the high seas except where banning
high seas salmon fishing would "result in economic dislocation."'
Even if a state successfully claimed such dislocation, any high seas
salmon fishing must be conducted pursuant to an agreement with
the state of origin. 29 "In the absence of an agreement on terms
and conditions, high seas fishing for anadromous species is
forbidden., 31 The type of regulations that can be imposed on
high seas salmon fishing by the state of origin, including imposing
catch quotas, appears to be without constraint.31
For enforcement of regulations related to high seas salmon
fishing, the state of origin and the high seas fishing state must
reach an agreement. 32 The state of origin has regulatory control
of salmon fishing activity on the high seas but lacks the authority
to unilaterally enforce these regulations. 33 Illicit high seas salmon
fishing, however, clearly breaches the LOS Convention.'
Of course, salmon do not restrict their movement to the state
of origin's waters and the high seas. They also venture into other
states' waters. Thus, in a state's own waters, its fishers can
intercept salmon from another country. The general principle that
the state of origin has the primary interest in salmon applies in
these transborder situations. Also, the state of origin can establish
the total allowable catch for its neighbor's waters. Nevertheless,
the state of origin cannot directly regulate salmon fishery in a
neighboring state.35 Pursuant to the LOS Convention, the
neighboring state to which salmon migrate must cooperate with the
state of origin regarding the stocks' conservation and management.36 Thus, although a special regime covers anadromous
species, the salmon regime giving the state of origin primacy yields,
28. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 66(3)(a). This exception aimed to accommodate Japan's investment and involvement respecting high seas fishing. Burke, supra note
20, at 104.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Burke, supra note 20, at 105.
Id.
LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 66(2).
Id. art. 66(3)(d). See Burke, supra note 20, at 106.
Burke, supra note 20, at 117.

34. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 66(3)(d).
35. Burke, supra note 20, at 117.

36. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 66(4).
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to a large extent, to the 200-n. mile zone regime's sovereignty
aspects.
B. The Legal Status of the Anadromous Species Regime
The legality of the LOS Convention's anadromous species
provisions is relevant to Canadian-U.S. negotiations on west coast
salmon because the state of origin principle and the duty to
cooperate establish the framework for discussions. As a matter of
technical treaty law, the LOS Convention came into force in
37
November 1994 for those states that had ratified the treaty.
Canada's Minister of Foriegn Affairs, Andre Ouellet, announced
in the House of Commons that Canada "will soon" become a party
to the LOS Convention.38 Despite this assurance, it is not a
foregone conclusion that Canada will become a party to the treaty
or when this may occur.39
While it is evident that Canada is moving toward becoming a
party to the LOS Convention, recent Canadian action on the East
Coast has presented a problem. In May 1994, Canada enacted
changes to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. 4° It also produced regulations, such as the Coastal Fisheries Protection
Regulations, giving Canada the legislative capacity to enforce
international regulations on fisheries' stocks located adjacent to
Canada's 200-n. mile zone.41
Canada also changed its acceptance of the compulsory
This
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).'
change prevented the ICJ from reviewing the legality of Canada's
new legislation.43 The LOS Convention's dispute settlement
process provides compulsory dispute settlement for issues of
navigation and fishing on the high seas (beyond 200-n. miles). 44

37. Id. art. 308.
38. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, vol. 133, at 2255 (Mar. 15, 1994).
39. On Canada and ratification of the LOS Convention, see Ted L. McDorman, Will
CanadaRatify the Law of the Sea Convention?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 535-79 (1988).
40. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, ch. 14, 1994 S.C. 1 (Can.).
41. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 413 (1978), amended by
SOR/94-362, 1994 C. Gaz. 2222-27 (Can.).
42. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Press Release,
Canada Takes Action To End Foreign Overfishing (May 10, 1994).
43. Id.
44. See LOS Convention, supra note 8, Part XV, § 2, arts. 286-96. On the dispute
settlement process and procedures of the LOS Convention, see generally A.O. ADEDE,
THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
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Canada's decision to restrict its acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory
dispute settlement may be perceived as inconsistent with the LOS
Convention requirement to allow such settlement. Thus, the
conflict with dispute settlement requirements may delay Canadian
ratification of the LOS Convention.
It would also be complicated for the United States to become
a party to the LOS Convention. First, the United States was one
of the few countries that did not sign the LOS Convention.
Although U.S. concerns with the LOS Convention centered on the
deep seabed mining regime,46 much of the LOS Convention has
been regarded with a degree of antipathy. Second, for the United
States to become a party, the U.S. Senate must give its advice and
consent. The treaty's complexity, the lack of a clearly identifiable
constitutency supporting the treaty, and the U.S. history of
ambivalence toward the treaty appear to be major strikes against
Senate ratification. Nevertheless, the U.S. Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, announced that the LOS Convention would
be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in late 1994
or early 1995. 47
Virtually all industrialized countries shared U.S. concerns
about the deep seabed mining regime in the LOS Convention. The
fact that no industrialized country was among the first sixty states
to ratify the LOS Convention illustrates these concerns. The Draft
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 has addressed many of these concerns. This Agreement will
substantially alter the LOS Convention's deep seabed regime and
will apply provisionally until 1998 or until it comes into force. At
such time, it will supercede parts of the LOS Convention. The
goal of the Agreement is to entice industrialized countries to ratify
the LOS Convention "as amended." 48

ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 285 (1987);

J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL

DISPuTE

SETTLEMENT 155-78 (2d ed. 1991).
45. A full evaluation of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this Article.
46. See MARKUS G. SCHMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? 336

(1989).

47. Letter from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Senator Claiborne Pell (June
30, 1994), reproduced in 140 CONG. REC. 8095 (1994); see also Oceans Policy and the Law
of the Sea Convention, 140 CONG. REC. 8095-97 (1994).
48. See Report of the Consultations of the Secretary-Generalon Outstanding Issues
Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 36, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/48/950,
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If Canada and the United States ratify the LOS Convention,
the anadromous species regime provisions would legally bind
Canada and the United States. Even if Canada and the United
States are not bound to the LOS Convention's anadromous species
regime through international treaty law, it can be argued that
customary international law causes the Article 66 regime to bind
these two countries.
When all the interested parties have carefully negotiated and
accepted a regime without dissent in a consensus document, it can
become part of customary international law, thereby binding all
states. 49 The transition from treaty text to customary international law is easier where a significant amount of state practice follows
the wording and concepts in a treaty. A recent examination of the
possibility that the LOS Convention's salmon provisions are part
of customary international law concluded that the treaty provisions
relating to high seas salmon fishing are largely being followed."0
Canada has asserted that the LOS Convention's state of origin
principle is also part of customary international law, entailing
salmon ownership for the state of origin and obligating all other
states to reduce interceptions.51 Canada believes this principle
applies to high seas salmon fishing as well as neighboring state
salmon interceptions.52
Thus, Canada's ownership concept
requires the intercepting state to compensate Canada for the

(1994). The full details of the above Agreement, its entry into force, and its relationship
with the LOS Convention are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally E.D. Brown,
Neither Necessary Nor Prudent at This Stage: The Regime of Seabed Mining and its Impact
on the Universality of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 17 MARINE POL'Y 81107 (1993); Moritaka Hayashi, Effect of the Entry Into Force of the 1982 U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea on the Ocean and Coastal Areas, Paper Presented at the Singapore
Conference on Sustainable Development of Coastal and Ocean Areas in South-East Asia:
Post Rio Perspectives (May 28-29, 1994).
49. See generally Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 717-38 (Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory eds., 1989); MARK E.
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 432 (1985); Bin Cheng,
Custom: The Futureof GeneralState Practicein a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND

THEORY 513-54 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 180-85 (1986).

50. Burke, supra note 20, at 119. "In the absence of agreement, a directed fishery for
salmon on the high seas is illicit." Id.
51. PACIFIC SALMON COMMISSION, Statement Regarding the CanadianPosition (Dec.
3, 1992), in 1992 EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 5.
52. Id

486

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 17:477

interceptions.53 Under customary international law, neighboring
states that are not the states of origin "have accepted the obligation to minimize interceptions of anadromous species of foreign
origin."'
Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether customary
international law requires such minimization or whether there is an
obligation to compensate the state of origin for interceptions.
Even if Article 66 of the LOS Convention binds Canada and
the United States through treaty or customary international law,
the meaning and implication of the state of origin's primary
interest and its operation with respect to neighbors is ambiguous.
A failure to cooperate with transborder salmon stocks' conservation and management could constitute a breach of international
obligation."
This obligation, however, is primarily useful to
create a platform for negotiations, not to force states into an
agreement.
If Canada and the United States become parties to the LOS
Convention, the treaty's dispute settlement process would be
available to either country for Article 66 interpretation and
application. Although the LOS Convention contains Xprovisions
regarding compulsory third party dispute settlement, disputes
regarding a coastal state's "sovereign rights with respect to living
resources in the exclusive economic zone" are exempt from
compulsory adjudication.57 This phraseology would include U.S.
interceptions of Canadian salmon and the application of the
Article 66 salmon regime between neighbors. For certain types of
fisheries disputes exempt from compulsory adjudication, the LOS
Convention mandates employing a conciliation commission.58
None of the listed situations, however, encompass U.S. fishers'
alleged excessive interception of Canadian salmon. Thus, while
the LOS Convention provides dispute settlement options, none of
the mandated procedures directly apply to assist a state whose
neighbor has misapplied Article 66. The reality of international

53. Id See also Joy A. Yanagida, The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 577,
589 (1987).
54. Burke, supra note 20, at 117.
55. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 66(4).
56. See id. pt. XV, § 2, arts. 286-96. On the dispute settlement process and procedures
of the LOS Convention, see generally ADEDE, supra note 44, at 285; MERRILLS, supra
note 44 at 155-78.
57. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 297(3)(a).
58. Id art. 297(3)(b).
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relations, particularly between Canada and the United States, is
that third party adjudication or conciliation, even if directly
applicable, is only utilized in exceptional circumstances.59
III.

THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON TREATY

A. Reaching Agreement
Since the 1930s, Canada and the United States have jointly
managed Fraser River sockeye salmon. In 1958, Fraser River pink
salmon also came under the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
The 1930 Fraser River
Commission's management control.'
Treaty divided these sockeye and pink salmon resources equally
between the two countries, and this salmon arrangement was
perceived as successful. 61 Nevertheless, changes in allocation
arrangements and salmon species expansion requiring joint
management seemed necessary. Concern that high levels of
interceptions would prevent the benefits of money spent on salmon
enhancement from accruing to the investing country motivated
Canada and the United States to consider reallocation.62 The
interceptions discouraged salmon enhancement and, more
generally, inhibited the state of origin from properly managing the
salmon.
In 1971, Canada and the United States commenced discussions
on a revised treaty regime for Pacific salmon management. 63 At
UNCLOS III, both Canada and the United States endorsed the
state of origin principle. This principle was central to the revised
treaty discussions. As one observer noted: "[t]o be internationally
credible, the state-of-origin principle required that the Americans

59. Canada and the United States have demonstrated an overwhelming preference for
negotiation as the primary means to manage and resolve the countless disputes that arise
between the two countries. See RICHARD BILDER, WHEN NEIGHBOURS QUARREL:
CANADA-U.S. DISPUTE SETrLEMENT EXPERIENCE 25 (1984); see generally id. at 24-63.
60. For a brief discussion of the Fraser River Treaty, see Jensen, supra note 4, at 37376. For a more detailed study, see JOHN F. Roos, RESTORING FRASER RIVER SALMON:
A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES COMMISSION 1937-1985,
at 438 (1985).
61. Jensen, supra note 4, at 375; Yogis, supra note 7, at 399-400.
62. "Overharvest by the intercepting jurisdiction can also jeopardize artifical or natural
salmon enhancement programs: the home country will be understandably reluctant to
invest in hatcheries or habitat restoration if the fish produced are caught by fishermen of
another nation." Jensen, supra note 4, at 371.
63. 1L at 379-80.
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and Canadians seek to disentangle their mutual fisheries."'
Nevertheless, the Canadian and U.S. historic pattern of salmon
interception 65 and species' intermingling made it impossible to
strictly adhere to the state of origin principle. Instead, the
negotiators contemplated trading off salmon interceptions to
achieve a balance between the two countries.
The negotiations for a new west coast salmon treaty proved
to be extremely difficult. Competing interests within each
country-particularly within the United States--of harvesters that
relied on interception and those that relied on the salmon
returning to their rivers of origin was the primary hindrance to the
negotiations.66 There was also evidence in the 1970s and 80s of
depletion of chinook salmon originating from the states of
Washington and Oregon, which required conservation measures to
ensure preservation.'
This problem further complicated the
negotiations, because chinook was the grinciple U.S. salmon
species that Canadian fishers intercepted.
Thus, the diminishment of chinook made balancing interceptions between the two
countries even more difficult.
Canada was "literally outraged" when the United States
refused to accept a deal on salmon which was concluded in 1982
between the two countries.69 Canada reacted to this U.S. rejection by intensely fishing salmon important to the United States to
pressure the United States into an acceptable salmon treaty.70
64. Johnson, supra note 13, at 81. See also Burke, supra note 20, at 110.
65. The 1930 Fraser River Treaty assured the United States an equal share of the
sockeye and pink salmon from the Fraser River. Canadian fishers had long been
intercepting significant amounts of chinook salmon originating in the Columbia River and
other Washington and Oregon rivers. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 384-86.

66. Concerning the complex interactions in the United States, see Jensen, supra note
4, at 384-95; Yanagida, supra note 53, at 579-88.
67. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 387-90.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 395. See also Marlyn Twitchell, Implementing the U.S.-Canada Pacific
Salmon Treaty: The Struggle to Move From "Fish Wars" to Cooperative Fishery
Management, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 409, 412 (1989).
70. See Gordon R. Munro & Robert L. Stokes, The Canada-United States Pacific
Salmon Treaty, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW

LAW OF THE SEA 26 (D. McRae & G. Munro eds., 1989). There is an inherent need for
joint management of west coast salmon because negative effects arise when the United
States and Canada intercept each other's salmon. Thus, Canada and the United States
were caught in the prisoners dilemma-rational decision-making resulting in outcomes
each recognized as inferior yet without cooperation the lesser outcome is inevitable.
Without cooperating in west coast salmon management, each country's attempts to
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This pressure, combined with the U.S. objective to improve
relations with Canada71 and an important compromise among
competing U.S. interests, 72 led to the conclusion, and entry into

force, of the new west coast salmon treaty in 1985.
B.

Contents and Operation

Beyond the Fraser River salmon species, the 1985 Pacific
Salmon Treaty also covered the transboundary rivers' salmon

species. 73 In particular, this includes salmon of the Stikine, Taku,
and Alsek Rivers which flow through the Alaska panhandle;
salmon of the British Columbia-Alaska ocean boundary area;74

and chinook and coho salmon, which are primarily of U.S.
origin.75 On its face, the 1985 Treaty was an ambitious and
comprehensive attempt to jointly manage North America's
northwest regional salmon resources.
Canada favored the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty because it
replaced the 1930 Fraser River Convention obligation, which
guaranteed fifty percent of the resource to the United States, and
instead based U.S. allocations on equity.76 Article III(1)(b) of the
treaty captures the equity concept: "[e]ach Party shall conduct its
fisheries and its salmon enhancement programs so as to ...
provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the
production of salmon originating in its waters. 77 The concept is
simple, reflecting the state of origin principle in the LOS Conven-

maximize its catch could inevitably destroy the resource itself. d at 18-19.
71. The United States identified the west coast salmon dispute as an issue that could
be resolved in time for the infamous "Shamrock Summit" in March 1985 between U.S.
President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney. At this Quebec City meeting,
the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty was finalized. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 397-99; Munro
& Stokes, supra note 70, at 28.
72. Native Americans forced Alaska to moderate its position. See Jensen, supra note
4, at 398.
73. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, art. 1(7); see also id. art. VII and annex IV,
ch. 1; Jensen, supra note 4, at 407-08.
74. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, annex IV, ch. 1; see Jensen, supra note 4,
at 410. The British Columbia-Alaska ocean boundary area is commonly referred to as the
Dixon Entrance area and is the subject of an ocean boundary dispute between Canada and
the United States. For a brief note on the ocean boundary dispute, see McDorman, supra
note 24, at 372-75.
75. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, annex IV, chs. 3, 5; see also Jensen, supra
note 4, at 405-07.
76. See Fraser River Treaty, supra note 6, art. IV.
77. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, art. Ill(1)(b).
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tion 78 that each country should benefit from the resources
originating in its rivers.79 Utilizing this principle in the 1985
Pacific Salmon Treaty, the United States was to receive a fixed
number-rather than a fixed percentage-of the Fraser River
salmon, and Canada would be compensated through its interception of U.S.-origin coho and chinook.80 The Memorandum of
Understanding attached to the Pacific Salmon Treaty indicates that
precise interception trade-offs were to be examined in the
future.81 It also provides that until agreement could be reached,
the annual fishery arrangements were to be developed "in an
equitable manner."' Thus, while the equity concept was accepted
in principle, its precise operation was much circumscribed.83
As well as the controversial equity principle, the two nations
committed themselves to "prevent overfishing and provide for
optimum production.

'

The United States and Canada deter-

mined that to meet the objectives of conservation and equity, it
was desirable to reduce mutual interceptions and avoid undue
disruption of existing fisheries.85 These ideals conflict, allowing
fishers in both countries to point to different parts of the Pacific
Salmon Treaty to support their activities.6
78. "In essence, the goal of allocating benefits as a matter of 'equity' between the two
parties is a functional device allowing for the acknowledgement of the dominant position
of the state of origin." Burke, supra note 20, at 111.
79. The simplicity is deceptive because Canada and the United States have differing
views of equity. For a good explanation, see Yanagida, supra note 53, at 588.
80. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, art. III.
81. "[It] is anticipated that it will be some time before the Commission can develop
programs to implement the provisions of Article Ill, paragraph 1(b) in a complete and
comprehensive manner." Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Implementation of
Pacific Salmon Treaty art. III, I 1(b) (Jan. 28, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Understanding].
In order to implement the equity principle, each country must estimate the value
of the salmon it produces that are harvested by the other country. Because the
countries currently lack sufficient data on the value of the intercepted fish, the
equity principle will be implemented through a phased approach, as data is
gathered.
Id See Jensen, supra note 4, at 404; Twitchell, supra note 69, at 412.
82. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 81, at I 1(b).
83. Yanagida, supra note 53, at 589-90.
84. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, art. III(1)(a).
85. Id. art. 111(3).
86. Twitchell describes the conflict as follows: "Fishers who feel they aren't getting
enough fish and want to increase their allocation, however, invoke 'equity' as a debating
point. Intercepting fishers counter that the treaty also prohibits 'undue disruption' of
existing fisheries, and therefore their allocation should not be altered." Twitchell, supra
note 69, at 419.
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The Pacific Salmon Treaty established the Pacific Salmon
Commission to make recommendations to the two governments on
conservation and allocation of the salmon covered by the Treaty.' Canadian and U.S. appointees 88 comprise this Commission
and both sides must agree upon the Commission's decisions and
recommendations.8 9 Three panels assist the Pacific Salmon
Commission: the Fraser River Panel for sockeye and pink salmon,
the Southern Panel for salmon originating in rivers south of Cape
Caution, and the Northern Panel for salmon originating in rivers
between Cape Caution and Cape Suckling.9° As well as creating
this bureaucratic structure, the Annex to the 1985 Pacific Salmon
Treaty outlined short term agreements on harvest arrangements
for specific stocks.91 From the Canadian viewpoint, Fraser River
sockeye and pink salmon were the most important species.'
Estimates stated that eighty percent of U.S. interception of
Canadian salmon was Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon. 93
As noted earlier, the United States yielded its right to fifty percent
of this resource.94 For the Fraser River, a two step allocation
agreement was devised, entitling the United States to a predetermined harvest volume for 1985-1988 and setting an aggregate
limit of 7 million sockeye and 7.2 million pink salmon for 19891992.9' In 1989, the Treaty called for the Fraser River Panel and
the Pacific Salmon Commission to apply the equity principle and
consider altering the allocations. 96
IV. BREAKDOWN OF THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
Serious problems with the Pacific Salmon Treaty arose in
1992. Despite the Treaty's allocation agreement for Fraser River
87. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 11(8), IV(5)-(6).
88. Id. art. 11(3).
89. Id arts. 11(1) and (6).

90. Id annex I.
91. Id annex IV. For an outline of the management regimes in the 1985 Treaty, see
Twitchell, supra note 69, at 413-17. A revision of Annex IV became effective May 17,
1991, and extended the management regime for some of the salmon species into the 1990s.
This revised Annex IV is reprinted in PACIFIC SALMON COMMISSION, 1992 EIGHTH
ANNUAL REPORT 129-47.

92. Munro & Stokes, supra note 70, at 29 (citing a Canadian government press
release).
93. Id

94. See Fraser River Treaty, supra note 6, art. IV.
95. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 3, annex IV, ch. 4, § 1(0.
96. Id annex IV, ch. 4, § 1(g).
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salmon, Canada and the United States could not agree on a joint
management plan for 1992. 97 The United States announced its
intention to catch 870,000 sockeye salmon, exceeding Treaty limits
by over 400,000 salmon.98 For the 1992 season, Canada estimated
that the United States actually exceeded its Treaty obligation by
337,000 sockeye. 9 In addition to this perceived U.S. overfishing,
there was a poor run of chinook salmon that "resulted in Canada
failing to reap comparable rewards from its intercepting" practices." Hence, the Canadians believed that the United States was
benefitting from excessive interceptions while Canada was unable
to even the balance through a similarly expanded interception
program.
This perceived inequity was symptomatic of the overall
imbalance that Canada felt took place under the 1985 Pacific
Salmon Treaty.'
Canada believed that U.S. interceptions of
Canadian salmon had increased dramatically during the period of
the Pacific Salmon Treaty, while Canadian interception of U.S.
salmon had significantly declined due to the weak coho and
1°
chinook runs from the northwestern United States."
In addition, Alaskan interceptions of Canadian-origin salmon from the
transboundary rivers was still a problem. 0 3 This same issue led
to the first deadlock at the Pacific Salmon Commission in
1987.'0' In 1992, the Pacific Salmon Commission's data revealed
that U.S. interceptions increased from 6 million to 9 million
salmon between 1985 and 1992, while Canadian interceptions
decreased from 5 million to 3.5 million."° In particular, the
Alaskan interceptions of Canadian-origin stocks had increased
from 3 million to 5 milhon.'0 6
Against this background, Canada and the United States
commenced negotiations to renew arrangements for Fraser River

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Canada Stands by Treaty, 5 PACIFIC TIDINGS 1-2 (1992).
Id. at 1.
Statement Regarding the CanadianPosition,supra note 51, at 9.
Id.
See id. at 8-9.
See id.
See Twitchell, supra note 69, at 417-18.

104. Id
105. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Backgrounder (April

1994) in Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Licence Fee
Announced For U.S. Vessels (June 9, 1994).
106. Id.
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sockeye and pink salmon management, alter the perceived high
interception levels in Alaskan waters, and extend and renew other
parts of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. 1"7 Canada's position on
issues of principle remained largely unchanged from the negotiations that preceded the 1985 Treaty."
Canada insisted that
salmon from its rivers were Canadian "owned;" therefore, U.S.
interception of Canadian-origin salmon required compensation. a°9
The United States recognized the need for restraint with respect
to the Fraser River stocks but stressed the precarious position of
U.S.-origin chinook and coho salmon, emphasizing the need to
conserve resources."' The United States recognized Canada's
high priority on equity but contended that "a numerically simplistic
('bean counting') economic evaluation of production and benefits
is not the best way to proceed."'' n
Internal dissension among representatives from Washington,
Oregon, Alaska, and the Native American organizations complicated the negotiating position of the United States. In particular,
Alaska relied on interceptions and saw no need to reduce this
effort, while Washington and Oregon worried about the recovery
of endangered stocks and hoped to restrain Canadian fishing of
these stocks.12 Because each representative had a veto, this
further complicated the achievement of a unified U.S. negotiating
position. The lack of unity and constant squabbling within the
U.S. negotiating
team was a source of considerable frustration for
3
Canada.1
The Pacific Salmon Treaty was clearly collapsing. Washington
and Oregon fishers were demanding greater access to plentiful
Fraser River salmon and Alaskan fishers were increasingly
intercepting Canadian-origin salmon. 4 Meanwhile, Canada was

107. See Statement Regarding the Canadian Position,supra note 51, at 5.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. PACIFIC SALMON COMMISSION, Statement Regarding the United States Position
(Dec. 3, 1992) in 1992/93 EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 10, 12-14.
111. Id. at 16.
112. The division within the United States was a replay of the problems encountered
in initially agreeing to the Pacific Salmon Treaty. See Yanagida, supra note 53, at 579-88;
Jensen, supra note 4, at 384-95.
113. See Mark Hume, Canada Ready For War With U.S. Over Fish, VANCOUVER SUN,
May 27, 1994, at Al. See also Judith Lavole, Talks Fai4 Union Agent Seeks Wider Salmon
War, VICTORIA TIMES-COLONIST, May 28, 1994, at A1-A2.
114. See Twitchell, supra note 69, at 417-18.
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pressured to help conserve the weak U.S. chinook and coho
salmon runs, thus removing any possibility of balancing interceptions.115 While the conservation needs of the chinook and coho
gave Canada leverage in reaching an accord with Washington and
Oregon interests, no similar leverage existed respecting Alaskan
fishers' activities.
Despite these difficulties, an agreement for the Fraser River
was reached. n6 This agreement allowed U.S. fishers to capture
a minimum of twenty percent of the total allowable catch (TAC)
to a maximum of 2.806 million fish, depending upon the TAC level
for Fraser River sockeye. 7 For pink salmon, the United States
was entitled to 25.7 percent of the TAC to a maximum of 3.6
million fish. 118 For the transboundary rivers, the unacceptable
regime that existed up to 1992 was continued. n 9 An integral
part of the 1993 arrangements was an agreement to negotiate the
meaning and implementation of the equity concept detached from
technical negotiations on fisheries arrangements and catch
limits. 120 Despite the 1993 management agreement, Canada
wanted the separate negotiation tract for refining and implementing equity because it still believed that the Pacific
Salmon Treaty's
2
'
unresolved.1
remained
problems
underlying
In January 1994, Canada postponed scheduled negotiations,
citing a lack of U.S. proposals on the equity issue. 122 Efforts to
establish 1994 management arrangements under the Pacific Salmon
Treaty failed, and, in May 1994, Canada broke off negotiations,
citing frustration with the United States' inability to form a united
position. 23 From the Canadian perspective, Alaskan fishers
were continuing to capture unacceptable amounts of Canadian115. See Statement Regarding the United States Position,supra note 110, at 10, 12-14.
116. PACIFIC SALMON COMMISSION, Letter of Transmittal to Governments Regarding
Fishery Regimes For 1993, 1992/93 EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 127-28 (1993).
117. Id.
118. Id
119. See id.
120. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Canada-U.S.
Agreement Reached on Pacific Salmon Harvest (June 24, 1993).
121. See id.
122. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Canada Cancels
Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) Negotiations (Jan. 20, 1994).
123. See Yanagida, supra note 53, at 579-88; Jensen, supra note 4, at 384-95; Hume
supra note 113, at Al; Lavole, supra note 113, at A1-A2. See also Maria Williams, Canada
Quits Salmon Talks - Failureto Reach Treaty With U.S. Ups Odds of a Fish War, SEATTLE
TnMEs, May 27, 1994, at Al.
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Also, the Washington and Oregon commercial

salmon fishery was closing for conservation reasons,'2 4 which
would increase the pressure from Washington and Oregon fishers

on Canadian stocks. As a pressure tactic in the past, Canada
aggressively fished Fraser River stocks to reduce the amount
escaping into U.S. waters and aggressively intercepted U.S.
chinook and coho salmon.'25 In 1994, however, these tactics
were regarded as conservationally irresponsible. 126 Instead, in
June 1994, the Canadian government announced that all U.S.

commercial fishing vessels crossing selected "inside water passages" along the British Columbian coast would be required to
purchase a license from Canada. 127 The $1,500 (Cdn.) transit

license was designed to apply to the approximately 300 U.S. fishing
vessels that use the Canadian waterways to travel from Washing-

ton and Oregon to Alaskan waters to harvest salmon.' 2
Canadian reaction to the transit license measure was positive,

primarily because the action was perceived as toughening Canada's
stance vis-A-vis the United States, inevitably a politically popular
position. 129 The U.S. Department of State protested the license,130 and many U.S. west coast politicians and fishing groups
were predictably outraged. 13' Both the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives introduced and passed bills directing the U.S.
U.S. fishers for any transit license fees
Government to reimburse
32
Canada.1
to
paid

124. U.S. Closes Pacific Salmon Fisheries,FISHING NEWS INT'L, May 1994, at 45.
125. Munro & Stokes, supra note 70, at 26.
126. See Brian Tobin, Licence Fee Got Message Through to Americans, VICrORIA
TIMES-COLONIST, July 29, 1994, at A5.

127. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Licence Fee
Announced For U.S. Vessels (June 9, 1994); Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations,
C.R.C., ch. 413 (1978), amended by SOR/94-444, 1994 C. Gaz. 2575-78 (Can.).
128. See Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Licence Fee
Announced For U.S. Vessels (June 9, 1994).
129. See Tobin, supra note 126, at A5.
130. See Joe Haberstroh et al., FishingBoats Face CanadaFees Today, SEATrLE TIMES,
June 15, 1994, at Al.
131. See id.; Cernetig, supra note 1, at Al, A4. See also Canada's Fee on U.S. Boats
is Pure Blackmail, SEATTLE TIMES, June 10, 1994, at B4.
132. S. 2243, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 3817, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Both
bills were to amend the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1971-1977. See
Dave Birkland et al., Canadian Toll Imposes "Quiet Time" on US. Fishermen, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 16, 1994, at Al.
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Vice President Gore's direct intervention led Canada to
remove the transit license requirement and resume negotiations.133 Reportedly, Vice President Gore assured Canada that:
(1) the United States would reverse the trend of intercepting
increasing amounts of Canadian salmon, (2) the United States
would regulate its fishery to protect sensitive stocks, and (3) a
renewed salmon treaty would cover more than a single year."M
Significantly, the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty arrangements only
became acceptable to the United States when the Reagan
Administration interceded.135
Thus, Vice President Gore's
participation appears to be essential to any successful conclusion
of west coast salmon arrangements in the near future.
Despite Vice President Gore's intercession, Canada and the
United States were unable to agree on a joint management
arrangement for 1994. The United States felt that Canada had
agreed to apply the 1993 arrangements in 1994.136 Canadian
officials strongly denied this, indicating that Canada would develop
an independent salmon plan.137 This discrepancy demonstrates
the inability of Canada and the United States to agree on what
had occurred in negotiations and is symptomatic of the problems
between the two countries.
This dispute's escalation could result in Canada again taking
conservationally-questionable measures when harvesting its own
salmon resources in an attempt to make these fish unavailable for
U.S. interception and to apply pressure on already dangerously low
U.S.-origin chinook and coho stocks. The reality is that Canada,
otherwise, has little effective or palatable leverage in its negotiations with the United States.
While the Canadian transit license had the desired effect of
attracting attention at the U.S. Government's highest levels, 138 it

133. Gore's Assurance on Salmon Lifts Block on Stalled Talks, VICTORIA TIMESCOLONIST, July 3, 1994, at A2.

134.
July 4,
135.
136.

Karen Gram, Canada Catches Concessions in Salmon Scrap, VANCOUVER SUN,
1994, at B1.
See Jensen, supra note 4, at 397-99; Munro & Stokes, supra note 70, at 28.
No New Deal, So Canada, U.S. to Follow '93 Salmon Plan, VICTORIA TIMES-

COLONIST, July 23, 1994, at A2.

137. Ottawa Fish Official Denies Agreement on Use of '93 Rules, VICTORIA TIMESCOLONIST, July 26, 1994, at A3; U.S. Negotiators Being Mischievous-Zirnhelt,VICTORIA
TIMES-COLONIST, July 27, 1994, at A3. See Plan Targets Sockeye-Aims to Save Coho,
Springs, VICTORIA TIMES-COLONIST, July 29, 1994, at A3.

138. Tobin, supra note 126, at A5.
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remains to be seen whether this action will result in fruitful
negotiations. Because the license measure interfered with vessel
passage, it has been criticized
in the United States as inconsistent
139
law.
international
with

V.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY OF THE TRANSIT LICENSE

The Inside Passage, a series of channels and waterways cutting
in a north-south direction along the British Columbian coast,
allows vessel passage in sheltered waters landward of fringing
islands. Although not usually considered part of the Inside
Passage, the waters between the British Columbian mainland and
Vancouver Island are the most obvious channels and waterways.
The June 1994 transit license requirement encompassed these
waterways.1" A transit license was also needed for other waterways more properly part of the Inside Passage, specifically Fitz
Hugh Sound, Finlayson Channel, Princess Royal Channel, Principe
These
Channel, Grenville Channel, and Laredo Sound.14 '
waterways are north of Vancouver Island, south of Prince Rupert,
and landward of numerous offshore islands along the British
Columbian coastline. Clearly, Canada selected waterways that
were integral to Canada's land mass. For example, Canada
avoided requiring a transit license for the Hecate Strait between
the British Columbian mainland and Queen Charlotte Islands.
Until June 1994, U.S. fishing vessels enjoyed an explicit
exemption under Canadian law permitting travel through the
Inside Passage without a license or permission to enter Canadian
waters. 142 Other foreign fishing vessels did not enjoy a similar
exemption and were required to obtain a license to enter Canadian
waters, 143 unless a vessel was in distress'44 or "for the purpose
of passing through such waters during the course of a voyage to a

139. S.2243, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This bill specifically recites that under
international law, U.S. vessels have a right of innocent passage through the "Inside
Passage" off the Pacific Coast of Canada and that Canada's transit license is inconsistent
with this right. Id
140. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 413 (1978), amended by
SOR/94-444, 1994 C. Gaz. 2575-78 (Can.).
141. Id.
142. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 413, § 17 (1978), amended by
SOR/85-257, 1985 C. Gaz. 2575 § 13 (Can.).
143. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33, § 3 (1985) (Can.).
144. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 413, § 14(1) (1978) (Can.).
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destination outside Canadian fisheries waters." '4 5
The
regulations' clear assumption was that the Inside Passage waters
were not part of Canada's territorial sea, thus necessitating the
explicit exemption for U.S. fishing vessels. While no explicit
license fee existed for non-U.S. vessels utilizing the Inside Passage,
the regulations directed that entry into any Canadian waters
required permission."
In June 1994, Canada removed the
explicit U.S. exemption and imposed a license fee on all foreign
fishing vessels using the Inside Passage.147
Canada's international legal justification for the transit license
is that Canada exercises absolute jurisdiction over these waters
because they are part of Canada's internal waters; therefore,
Canada can impose conditions and requirements on foreign vessels
and even prohibit foreign vessels from using these waters. 148 In
traditional parlance, a state's internal waters are those waters
landward of the baselines utilized to delineate the territorial sea
and economic zone. 149 The baselines can either be: (1) straight
baselines used to deal with geographically complex coastlines and
for which there are flexible criteria for construction,150 or (2)
baselines based upon the low water mark taking into account river
mouths and similar physical anomalies."'
Canada announced its straight baselines for the West Coast of
Queen Charlotte Islands and Vancouver Island in 1969.152 No
straight baseline has been proclaimed connecting the north of
Vancouver Island with the south of Queen Charlotte Islands,
145. Id. at § 15(1), amended by SOR/81-193, 1981 C. Gaz. 748 § 1 (Can.).
146. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33, § 3 (1985) (Can.).
147. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, Licence Fee
Announced For US. Vessels (June 9, 1994); Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations,
C.R.C., ch. 413 (1978), amended by SOR/94-444, 1994 C. Gaz. 2575-78 (Can.).
148. Concerning the international legal regime that applies to internal waters, see R.R.
CHURCHILL & A.V. LowE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 51-52 (1988). See also V.D. Degan,
Internal Waters, 17 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 3-44 (1986).

149. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 8(1).
150. Straight baselines, the criteria for them, and the application of the criteria have
been a topic of intense international interest. On the issues and problems of straight
baselines, see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 148, at 28-33; UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE
FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, BASELINES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE

SEA 17-26 (1989) [hereinafter BASELINES]; W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S.
WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION 242 (1992).
151. See BASELINES, supra note 150, at 1-15.
152. Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates Order, C.R.C., ch. 1550 (1978) (Can.).
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enclosing the Queen Charlotte Sound.'53 Nevertheless, Canada
has employed a fishery closing line across the Queen Charlotte
Sound.'54 The fishery closing line is a unique Canadian contribution to international practice. In 1971, the fishery closing line's
goal was to eliminate foreign fishing from selected near-shore
Canadian waters; however, its precise international legal status is
uncertain.155 It has been asserted that the waters of Hecate
Strait, Queen Charlotte Sound, and the waters landward of
1 56
Vancouver Island are historic internal waters of Canada.
Canada delineated its 200-n. mile zone for the British Columbian
coast assuming that the fishery closing line across Queen Charlotte
Sound is a proper baseline. 15 7 Moreover, the west coast 200-n.
mile fishing zone specifically excludes the waters seaward of the
fishery closing line, describing this area as "Fishing Zone 3 and

153. Canada has always been sensitive to U.S. reaction to utilization of straight
baselines that may be perceived as deviating from the internationally accepted criteria.
For a discussion of these criteria, see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 148, at 28-33;
BASELINES, supra note 150; REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 150. Despite the lack
of a length criterion for a straight baseline, such a baseline connecting Vancouver Island
and Queen Charlotte Islands could be perceived as too long, thus enclosing territorial sea
waters.
The United States officially protested Canada's 1969 straight baselines on the West
Coast. See United States, Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits In The Seas, (No. 112), United States
Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims 25 (1992). Canada's recent experience
with straight baselines has been in the Arctic, and the United States officially protested
Canada's straight baselines system. See generally DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC
WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159-79 (1988).

154. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 1, 2, and 3) Order, C.R.C., ch. 1547 (1977) (Can.).
155. Concerning Canada's fishery closing lines, see Johnson, supra note 13, at 68;
Legault, supra note 14, at 384. Regarding U.S. reaction to the fishery closing lines and
west coast straight baselines generally, see ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA 172-73 (1981).

156. See Lawrence L. Herman, Proof of Offshore Territorial Claims in Canada, 7
DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 7-8 (1982). The claim that certain waters are historic internal waters

of Canada is best known regarding Canada's Arctic. Concerning historic waters and the
Arctic, see generally PHARAND, supra note 153, at 89-130. Claims to historic waters are
difficult issues in the international law of the sea. See generally D.P. O'CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 417-38 (1982). Not surprisingly, therefore, states can
exempt disputes regarding historic title from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures
of the LOS Convention. Conciliation, however, remains available. LOS Convention,
supra note 8, art. 298(1)(a).
157. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, C.R.C., ch. 1548 (1978) (Can.).
The United States has never commented adversely about Canada's west coast 200-n. mile
zone.
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other areas within the internal waters and territorial sea of
Canada."15 8
In 1967, litigation between the Canadian Federal Government
and British Columbia concluded that Ottawa has jurisdiction over
the territorial sea and continental shelf on the West Coast. 159 In
1981, British Columbia declared that the waters and seabed
landward of the baselines and fishery lines that Canada used to
delineate the 200-n. mile zone were a provincial Inland Marine
Zone."6 A 1967 Supreme Court of Canada case did not raise
the issue of constitutional jurisdiction over internal waters, and
British Columbia asserted that it had jurisdiction over west coast
internal waters. 6 ' Further litigation in 1984 placed the seabed
under the waters between Vancouver Island and the mainland
under provincinal jurisdiction. 62 In reaching this conclusion, the
Supreme Court of Canada decided, as the Canadian Federal
Government had acknowledged, that the waters in question were
internal waters, not part of Canada's territorial sea.163 While not
determinative of the issue of internal waters under international
law, this constitutional litigation reflects the Canadian view that
the waters landward of Vancouver Island, where the transit license
was required, are internal waters.
These considerations-existing straight baselines, fishery
closing lines, historic waters possibility, and the geographical
reality that these waterways are an integral component of British

158. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, C.R.C., ch. 1548, § 5 (1978)

(Can.).

159. Reference Re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights, 65 D.L.R.2d 353 (1967)
(Can.).
160. British Columbia Order in Council 1347, June 4, 1981, made under the Petroleum
and Natural Gas Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 323, § 87(g) (1979) (Can.). See generally Peter Finkle
& Alastair Lucas, The Concept of the British Columbia Inland Marine Zone, 24 UNIV. B.C.
L. REv. 37-52 (1990).
161. The principal question before the Supreme Court of Canada in 1967 involved
constitutional jurisdiction of the territorial sea. "[H]arbours, bays, estuaries and other
similar inland waters" were excluded from consideration. Reference Re Ownership of OffShore Mineral Rights, 65 D.L.R.2d at 356. In 1967, Canada's west coast territorial waters
were delineated without benefit of straight baselines and were only 3-n. miles in width.
The assumptions underlying British Columbia's Inland Marine Zone are that the waters
are internal waters and that the 1967 Supreme Court of Canada decision applies to the
territorial sea regime, rather than to specific water areas. See Finkle & Lucas, supra note
160, at 39-42, 46-47.
162. Re Attorney-General of Canada and Attorney-General of British Columbia, 8
D.L.R.4th 161 (1984) (Can.).
163. Id at 167-71.
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Columbia's coast-lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
waterways where a transit license was required are, as a matter of
international law, part of Canada's internal waters. The Inside
Passage's connecting waterways along British Columbia's coast,
however, are of a different character. Internal waters are generally
ports, bays, and rivers. The Inside Passage waterways are more
closely related to a canal or similar internal interconnected
navigable waters. Nevertheless, even canals and similar navigable
internal waters, absent special international arrangements, are
subject to absolute sovereignty.' 64
The U.S. Senate Bill designed to respond to the Canadian
transit license asserts that vessels using Inside Passage waters have
an international right of innocent passage. 65 There are two
possible bases for this assertion. First, if the Inside Passage waters
are part of Canada's territorial sea, a coastal state's jurisdiction
over vessels in its territorial sea is subject to that vessel's right of
innocent passage.' 6" As noted above, Canada recognizes the
67
general right of innocent passage for foreign fishing vessels.
Nevertheless, the fringing islands' geography, in addition to past
Canadian actions regarding baselines, historic waters, and fishery
closing lines, make it difficult for the United States to successfully
sustain the argument that the waters to which the transit license
applied are territorial waters, not internal waters.
The second possible basis for the asserted innocent passage
right arises from Article 8(2) of the 1982 LOS Convention."
This Article provided that where straight baselines enclose waters
not previously considered as internal waters, the foreign vessel's
right of innocent passage applies. 69 Thus, under this provision,
innocent passage can exist even in internal waters. As a technical
matter, however, the lack of Canadian straight baselines in the
Inside Passage area defeats the potential application of Article
8(2). More broadly, the onus of showing application of Article
164. See CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 148, at 53-54.
165. S. 2243, 103d Cong., 2d Session, § 1(1), (3) (1994).
166. Concerning the right of innocent passage, see generally CHURCHILL & LOWE,
supra note 148, at 68-74.
167. See Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 413, § 15(1) (1978),
amended by SOR/81-193, 1981 C. Gaz. 748, § 1 (Can.).
168. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 8(2), which repeats Article 5(2) of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.

169. I&
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8(2) innocent passage rights would fall on the asserting state. In
this situation, the asserting state would be the United States.

Given the inconsistency of innocent passage with the internal
waters regime, the burden on the United States would be a heavy
one. United States acquiescence to Canada's special exemption
law for passage of U.S. fishing vessels through the Inside Passage
would invalidate the existence of an Article 8(2) innocent passage
right.

A variation of innocent passage, known as transit passage,
exists where waters in question are part of an international
strait.' 70 There was no direct assertion, however, that the Inside
Passage constituted an international strait. If made, such a claim
would be defeated easily because the 1Inside
Passage does not meet
71
strait.
international
an
of
criteria
the
Another possible U.S. argument regarding navigation rights in
the Inside Passage arises where navigable waters, because of their
proximity to two or more states, can be characterized as shared
waters. In such a case, one state's rights may circumscribe the
other's sovereignty over its portion of the waters. This situation
arose in the 1992 Honduras-El Salvador-Nicaraguacase172 before
the ICJ. In this case, the Court determined the legal status of the
Gulf of Fonseca, a body of water bordered by all three states. The
ICJ found a history of condominium in the Gulf, and therefore
held that the waters were to be shared, circumscribing the littoral
states' rights over the waters.17 Unlike a bay or strait with two
170. On international straits and the right of transit passage, see generally CHURCHILL
& LOwE, supra note 148, at 87-97. When waters constitute an international strait was a
major issue between Canada and the United States respecting the Northwest Passage. See
generally PHARAND, supra note 153, at 215-48.
171. The Inside Passage does not appear to meet geographical requirements of an
international strait-connecting bodies of high seas or economic zones-because the
Passage clearly connects Canadian waters. Moreover, while the Inside Passage may be
convenient for certain U.S. vessels, other waters are available for passage. Nevertheless,
there is some controversy regarding what constitutes an international strait. See
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 148, at 97; PHARAND, supra note 153, at 215-48.
172. The Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hon.: Nicar.
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Judgment of September 11).
173. Id. at 586-606. For a brief commentary on this aspect of the case, see International
Court of Justice: Recent Cases, 42 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 929, 934-36 (Malcolm D. Evans ed.,
1993); lain Scobbie, The ICJ and the Gulf of Fonseca: When Two Implies Three But Entails
One, 18 MARINE POL'Y 249, 251-53 (1994). The situation of shared waters is very complex
legally, and there is little commentary. For a dated, but still interesting, article on this
subject, see Jeffrey D. Ewen, Comment, The United States and Canada In Passamaquoddy
Bay: Internal Waters and the Right of Passage to a Foreign Port, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
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or more littoral states, the connecting British Columbian waterways of the Inside Passage and the waters landward of Vancouver
Island are not truly shared.
While port fees and navigation user fees are a well-accepted
international practice, 174 a "pure" transit fee arrangement raises
concerns for states, like the United States, with a strong interest in
protecting unimpeded navigational rights for both commercial and
security reasons.17 Transit fees usually arise in the context of
international straits with the suggested fees connected to marine
pollution prevention considerations.1 76 User states have strongly
resisted these types of transit fees. There is a possibility that other
states will misuse the Canadian transit license example in circumstances dissimilar to the British Columbian coastal situation, and
this possibility is a concern for both Canada and the United States.
While the international legality of Canada's transit license
action is evident, its implications cause concern. A few days after
Canada imposed the transit license, a proposal to subject an oil
pollution levy on Canadian vessels using the Strait of Juan de Fuca
surfaced in the United States.1 77 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the transit license requirement was revoked shortly after it
was introduced.
VI.

PROSPECrS FOR THE FUTURE

Few question the need for a joint U.S.-Canadian agreement
to cooperatively conserve and share the salmon species in the
Pacific Northwest. Several U.S. based salmon species are near
endangerment, and uncontrolled fishing of other species could lead
to the same result. Canada's emphasis on the species in extremis,

& COM. 167 (1976). See also O'CONNELL, supra note 156, at 315-17.
174. See 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 837 (1984).
175. The U.S. policy of asserting navigational rights in the face of conflicting claims
according to the Freedom of Navigation Program commenced in 1979. See United States
Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, supra note 153.
176. Malaysia and Indonesia recently abandoned the idea of a user fee to keep the
Malacca Strait free of pollution. Michael Vatikiotis & Susumu Awanohara, Political
Clean-up, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 5, 1992, at 10.
177. Larry Pynn, U.S. Ponders Fee For Canadian Vessels, VANCOUVER SUN, June 23,
1994, at A3. The State of Washington recently attempted to apply pollution prevention
regulations to vessels going to Canada through the Juan de Fuca Strait. This attempt
raises the issue of the Strait's international legal status. Wayne Hettenbach, Rough Waters
in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, 10 OCEANS POL'Y NEWS 6-7 (1993). See generally LOS
Convention, supra note 8, art. 45(1)(b); O'CONNELL, supra note 156, at 315-17.
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while sound from a conservational viewpoint, will not encourage
the United States to reduce its interception of Canadian "owned"
salmon. In cross-border salmon management, the state-of-origin
principle is a crucial component of existing international practices,
if not a binding principle of customary international law. Canada
has premised its position in the bilateral salmon discussions on
making the state of origin principle operational in its west coast
salmon relationship with the United States. Reducing U.S.
interception of salmon is costly, not only in foregone resources and
lost work, but also politically.
An international lawyer's answer to the dilemmas facing
Canada and the United States is to obtain a binding legal opinion
about the application of the state of origin principle. If, as Canada
asserts, the state of origin principle is equivalent to salmon
ownership, then any U.S. interception would require compensation
of direct monies or equivalent resources. In addition, it might be
easier for the United States to accept that interceptions must be
reduced or direct compensation paid if the decision came from an
international judicial authority rather than through a political
compromise. An independent panel could also decide the quantity
of compensation issue, as is frequently the case in domestic
situations. Of course, attempting to verify, quantify, and value
each country's interceptions is a problem that has bedevilled the
Pacific Salmon Commission and the negotiations between Canada
and the United States.
While such a "legal" approach may be helpful, it is a truism
of shared ocean resources that legal division of resources does not
lead to or necessarily encourage appropriate management of the
resource. Joint efforts to conserve and manage salmon species is
still required.
A resource manager's approach to the west coast salmon
problem is strict control over all harvesting practices coupled with
expanded enhancement programs. The key to this approach is the
resource manager's independence from political pressure by the
two countries. The result could be a truly independent Pacific
Salmon Commission with direct authority over the harvest and
enhancement practices of the two countries' fishers, instead of a
Commission composed of equal numbers from two protagonists,
where consensus is the operating principle. The most obvious
roadblocks to the independent Pacific Salmon Commission idea
are the loss of sovereignty, accountability, and national control
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over outcomes. Also, while the issue of total resources available
to be captured is a resource manager's issue, sharing between
countries is a political/negotiable issue. Thus, a neutral staff must
be appointed to the independent Pacific Salmon Commission to
decide allocation issues in order to avoid legitimacy concerns.
Short of reconstructing the institutional mechanism currently
in place, namely the Pacific Salmon Commission, the future holds
a continuing series of limited agreements for specific species, and
years of fish wars resulting from fruitless negotiations. The history
of the Pacific Salmon Treaty since 1985 clearly fits this pattern.
The nature of the entrenched interests leads to no other result.
West coast salmon arrangements between Canada and the United
States will remain on these nations' agendas for years to come.

[Vol. 17:477

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

506
Io

r

/

PRINCERUPERT

Grenville Channel
Principe Channel
HIecate

Srait
Princess Royal Channel
Finlayson Channel
sLaredo Sound
..

Zone 3
Queen.
Charlotte

$
FFitz

Hugh Sound

Zone 5'
British

Columbia
Pacific

-

---

0
I

00

Fisheries Closing Line
Straight Baselines
International Boundary
I

I

200 km
I

(P
'

~

VAOUE

5

'US.
>~

